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1. Introduction 
Homeland security and monitoring of critical infrastructures, such as buildings, bridges, 
nuclear power plants, aircrafts, etc., represent challenging application domains for modern 
networking technologies. In this context Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are gaining interest 
as a fundamental component of an advanced platform that embeds pervasive monitoring, 
networking and processing. Indeed, recent literature has addressed the perspectives of WSNs 
for monitoring structural and functional health of industrial plants, e.g. in (Akyildiz, et al., 2002; 
Bai et al., 2004; Barbaràn et al., 2007; Cho et al., 2008; Flammini et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2007): 
nevertheless, we can observe that the dominating paradigm is to exploit WSNs features in terms 
of a “network of small sensors”, while almost unexplored is the more advanced paradigm of 
“networked smart sensors” and the underlying opportunity to actually support autonomous 
(anomaly) detection processes. A large body of specialized literature deals with this topic and 
several ad-hoc solutions can be found. On the contrary, we try to develop a different approach 
in this context: resorting to security mechanisms that are made available in traditional networks 
can provide a suitable and reliable framework, while smart adaptations are targeted to meet 
tight resource constraints and possible performance degradation.  
Therefore we argue to demonstrate experimentally that, under certain limitations, a WSN 
can operate as a functionally “autonomous entity” not only for sensing operations. Despite 
the hard constraints on HW and the computation limitations, a WSN node is not just a 
sensing device (such as a magnetic contact or an infrared source): it is indeed a smart micro-
device equipped with CPU and memory and is able to perform some autonomous data pre-
processing, coding and transmission. Moreover the peculiar feature of a WSN with respect 
to a traditional sensor network is not to rely on fixed devices and cabling: nevertheless this 
comes at the cost of the availability of the so-called “ad-hoc” network properties (e.g. a 
sophisticated topology rearrangement mechanism is mandatory to achieve fault tolerance) 
as well as peer-to-peer frameworks, which imply enhanced protocol complexity and further 
computational and memory resource.  
However, if proper design approaches (Pugliese et al., 2009; Sangiovanni-Vincentelli & Martin, 
2001) are adopted, also the provision of fundamental security services (Hu et al., 2004; Law et 
al., 2005) can be pursued, which is a fundamental step towards the development of WSNs in 
critical applications; indeed the typical WSN deployment scenarios depicted above are highly 
exposed to physical capture or signal interception by external attackers much more than 
traditional sensors, which can be monitored by an extra-surveillance service.  
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Therefore providing security in a WSN system cannot be restricted to providing a robust 
cryptographic scheme, also because this kind of schemes are heavy demanding in terms of 
computational power and memory. Indeed a smart intrusion detection service should be 
provided also with ciphering and authentication in order to build up a “security service” 
package that will enhance the typical middleware services provided by an Application 
Execution Environment (AEE): this service package is the core feature of the proposed 
“secure platform” that is proposed, analyzed and tested in this chapter. 
This chapter is organized as follows:  Sec. 2 deals with the security services provided by the 
“Secure Platform”, Sec. 3 and Sec. 4 describe fundamental algorithms and architectures 
supporting those security services, Sec. 5 reports the design approach of the platform while 
Sec. 6 is concerned withy a prototype of implementation and related tests. Sec. 7 deals with a 
viable conformance path to the trusted computing guidelines (TCG, n.d.). 
2. Secure platform functions 
Fig. 1 shows the main functional blocks of the proposed Secure Platform: apart from the 
block providing the typical middleware services (MW Services) and shared memory, other 
specific services (in this case security-oriented) are implemented as customizations of 
specific SW component and provided to the AEE via different APIs. It is very important to 
note that the “secure platform approach” offers a promising guideline to design and 
implement “integrated security” over WSN in a “application-oriented” approach which is 
aligned to the current SW development paradigms over resource constrained devices (Gay, 
2003; Kliazovich, 2009; Sangiovanni-Vincentelli & Martin, 2001).  
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Fig. 1. Secure Platform Architecture 
In this case at least two functional blocks are provided: the cryptography module, which 
implements ECTAKS (Elliptic Curve-based Topology Authenticated Key Scheme), and the 
intrusion detection module, which implements WIDS (Weak process model-based Intrusion 
Detection System): the former one represents a novel contribution that enhances the 
capabilities of the approach in (Pugliese & Santucci, 2008) by exploiting the advanced 
security features of elliptic curves, while the latter one integrates the developments 
proposed in (Pugliese et al., 2008, 2009).  
www.intechopen.com
 Secure Platform Over Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
101 
TinyECC module (Liu, 2008) represents the ECC security package in WSN as it natively 
integrated with TinyOS (TinyOS, n.d.), the widely used operating system over WSN: 
ECTAKS, as we will show in next sections, rely on TinyECC security services to encrypt / 
decrypt messages. 
Next sections, Sec. 3 and Sec. 4, deal with ECTAKS and WIDS modules respectively as well 
as with security and cost evaluations; however further details, especially about the 
mathematical proofs of theorems and computation expressions, can be found in (Pugliese et 
al., 2008, 2009; Pugliese & Santucci, 2008). 
3. Elliptic curve-based topology authenticated key scheme (ECTAKS) 
3.1 Motivations 
In traditional networks such as the Internet, Public Key Cryptography (PKC) has been the 
enabling technology underlying many security services and protocols (e.g., SSL, IPsec). 
However, in WSNs PKC has not been widely adopted due to the resource constraints on 
sensor platforms, in particular the limited battery power and storage capacity. There has 
been intensive research aimed at developing techniques that can bypass PKC operations in 
sensor network applications. For example, there has been a substantial amount of research 
on random key pre-distribution for pair-wise key establishment, e.g. (Eschenauer & Gligor, 
2002). However, these alternative approaches do not offer the same degree of security or 
functionality of PKC. For instance, none of the random key pre-distribution schemes can 
guarantee key establishment between any two nodes and tolerate arbitrary node 
compromises at the same time. Pair-wise key establishment can always be achieved, e.g. by 
resorting to the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (Diffie & Hellman, 1976) without 
suffering from the node compromise problem and without requiring time synchronization.  
Thus, it is desirable to explore the application of PKC on resource constrained sensor 
platforms (Malan, 2004; Menezes, 1996). Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has been the 
top choice among various PKC options due to its fast computation, small key size, and 
compact signatures: for example, to provide equivalent security to 1024-bit RSA, an ECC 
scheme only needs 160 bits on various parameters, such as 160-bit finite field operations and 
160-bit key size (Gura et al., 2004). TinyECC, targeted at TinyOS, includes almost all known 
optimizations for ECC operations. 
Taking into account the above considerations, we will show how the “hybrid” topology-
based authentication logic (Topology Authenticated Key Scheme, TAKS) we proposed in 
(Pugliese & Santucci, 2008) can be enhanced using an ECC-based vector algebra (and, 
therefore, we now denote as ECTAKS) and be compatible with TinyECC.  
3.2 EC Extensions to vector algebra over GF 
Before starting with ECTAKS description, it is necessary to introduce some new algebraic 
tools and, specifically, the extension to elliptic curves of vector algebra over GF(q). Let 
( )EGF q  be a finite field and let 
3x ax b  , where , ( )Ea b GF q , be a cubic polynomial with 
the condition that 3 24 27 0a b   (this ensures that the polynomial has no multiple roots); an 
elliptic curve E over ( )EGF q  is the set of points ( , )x y  with , ( )Ex y GF q  that satisfies the 
www.intechopen.com
 Applied Cryptography and Network Security 
 
102 
condition 2 3y x ax b    and also an element denoted O called the “point at infinity”: the 
point at infinity is the point of intersection where the y-axis and the line at infinity (the 
collection of points on the projective plane for which z=0) meet. The elements over 
( ( ))EE GF q , or the point in E, are denoted #E which results to be a function of Eq . An elliptic 
curve E can be made into an Abelian group by defining an additive operation on its points 
(Koblitz, 1987). As the elements of a group can be generated starting from a base element, or 
generator, by successive multiplications with scalars, we introduce a supplementary field 
GF(q) with #q E , (therefore q is function of Eq ) and, as in TAKS, q N  where N 
represents the total number of nodes in the network (Pugliese & Santucci, 2008). It is 
important to note that ECTAK results to be a point on E. 
Let V be a vector space over GF(q) with the generic element v V  represented through the 3-
pla ( , , )x y zv v v  with , ,x y zv v v GF(q), let EV  be a vector space over E with the generic element 
in EV V  represented through the 3-pla  1 2 3, ,V V V  with 1 2 3, ,V V V E; let P, Q be points in E. 
We will denote elements in V as “scalar vectors” because their components are scalars in 
GF(q), and elements in EV  as “point vectors” because their components are points in E. ECC 
algebra introduces the “scalar by point product” (the operator symbol is usually omitted) 
which coincides with the addition of a point by itself many times the value of the scalar. 
ECC vector algebra introduces two new operators: the “scalar vector by point product” 
(denoted by the symbol  ) and the “scalar vector by point vector product” (denoted by the 
symbol  ). Identity elements are 0 ( )GF q , 0 (0,0,0) V   and ( , , ) EO O O O V  .  
The operator “scalar vector by point product” is a function formally represented as  
: EV E V   and defined by 
 ( , , ) ( , , )x y z x y zv P v v v P v P v P v P     (1) 
It is straightforward to show that 
 
0 (0,0,0) (0 ,0 ,0 ) ( , , )
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )x y z x y z
P P P P P O O O
v O v v v O v O v O v O O O O
  
  
 
   (2) 
and the distributive of   respect to + and vice-versa: 
 
( )
(( ) ,( ) ,( ) )
(( ),( ),( ))
x x y y z z
x x y y z z
a b P
a b P a b P a b P
a P b P a P b P a P b P
a P b P
 
   
   
 

 
 (3) 
 
( )
( , , ) ( )
( ( ), ( ), ( ))
(( ),( ),( ))
x y z
x y z
x x y y z z
v P Q
v v v P Q
v P Q v P Q v P Q
v P v Q v P v Q v P v Q
v P v Q
 
 
   
   
 


 
 (4) 
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The operator “scalar vector by point vector product” is a function formally represented as 
: EV V E    and defined by 
 1 2 3 1 2 3( , , ) ( , , )x y z x y zv V v v v V V V v V v V v V        (5) 
It is straightforward to show that 
 1 2 3 1 2 3
0 (0,0,0) ( , , ) 0 0 0
( , , ) ( , , )x y z x y z
V V V V V V V O
v O v v v O O O v O v O v O O
      
         (6) 
and the distributive of   respect to + and vice-versa: 
 
1 2 3
1 2 3
( ) ( ) ( , , )
( ) ( ) ( )x x y y z z
a b U a b U U U
a b U a b U a b U a U b U
    
            (7) 
 
1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 3 3
( ) ( , , ) ( , , )
( ) ( ) ( )
x y z
x y z
v V W v v v V W V W V W
v V W v V W v V W v V v W
      
           (8) 
The following identity ( ) ( )u v P u v P    holds:  
 
( )
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
( )
x y z x y z x y z
x x y y z z
u v P
u v P v P v P u u u v P v P v P
u v P u v P u v P u v P
 
   
    

 (9) 
where the operator · denotes the usual scalar product between two vectors of scalars. 
3.3 The scheme 
Along what done for TAKS, ECTAKS is pair-wise, deterministic, shared keys are not pre-
distributed but instead generated starting from partial key components. It exploits the 
impracticability in solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (EDLP), the 
analogous of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) applied to integers on GF(q) (Menezes et 
al., 1996).   
Let V be a vector space over GF(q), EV  be a vector space over E, ( )f  be a function defined 
on GF(q) and ( )F  defined on E satisfying the following requirements: 
 R1. Both ( )f  and ( )F  are one-way functions 
 R2. ( ) ( ') ( ') ( ) 0f u f u f u f u     for , 'u u V   and for any commutative operator   
 R3. ( , ) ( , )F u U F U u  for u V   and EU V  . 
Let (.)G  a function defined on E satisfying the following requirements: 
 R4. It must be a one-way function 
 R5. ( , )G u U   O must hold only for 'u V V   and 'E EU V V  , with 'V  and 'EV  
predefined sub-spaces of V and EV  respectively. 
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Definitions stated for TAKS in (Pugliese & Santucci, 2008) still hold true: each node stores 
the following information:  
 Private Key Component (PRKC) which is a vector of scalars over GF(q) 
 Public Key Component (PUKC) which is a vector of points over E 
 Local Topology Vector (LTV) which is a vector of scalars over GF(q). 
Information is classified according to the following definitions: 
 Public: any information anyone can access (attackers included) 
 Restricted: any information any node in the network can access 
 Private: any information only a single node in the network can access 
 Secret: any information only the planner can access. 
According to Kerkhoff's principle, the explicit expressions for both ( )f  and (.)G  are public. 
Fig. 2 reports the conceptual representation of the proposed scheme.  
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Fig. 2. Conceptual representation of the proposed cryptographic scheme 
Node jn  broadcasts jPUKC  and, among the others, node in  receives it and starts the 
authentication procedure by executing the verification function ( )G  with inputs iLTV  and 
jPUKC : if the result is the point at infinity O then node jn  has been successfully authenticated 
by node in  and iECTAK  is generated. The same steps are performed by node jn  and, in case 
of successful authentication, jECTAK  is generated. If ( )f  and ( )F  are compliant to 
requirements R1, R2 and R3, then iECTAK  and jECTAK  coincide and ECTAK is a symmetric 
key shared between nodes in  and jn . Therefore ECTAK defines the Shared Secret (SS) which is 
a mandatory common information shared by parties to encrypt and decrypt messages in 
standard ECC schemes, such as ECDSA, ECDH, ECIES implemented in TinyECC. 
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Let in  and jn  be a nodes pair. The following definitions are assumed: 
a. Let A V , M V . Elements in A are defined as follows: ,i ja a A   if ( ) 0i jm a a    
with m M  an arbitrary predefined vector over GF(q): this information is secret 
b. Let ( )b B GF q   be an arbitrary predefined scalar in B but not generator of GF(q): this 
information is secret 
c. Let c C V   be an arbitrary predefined vector over GF(q): this information is secret 
d. Let (.)( ) mf kb   where m M  satisfies (a) and ( )k GF q . This definition for ( )f  is 
compliant to specified requirements R1, R2 and R3 because for , 'v v V   and 
( )k GF q   is 'm v m vkb kb   = 'm v m vkb kb   =   2 'm v vk b    =    2 'm v vk b   , where   is 
the mod q product (commutative) operator. Hereinafter the symbol   will be 
omitted 
e. Let lik , l jk KL V   (this information is private) 
f. Let tiK , t jK EKT V   (this information is public) 
g. Let iLTV V . Elements iLTV  are defined to be co-planar to m  and ja  if jn  is an 
admissible neighbor of node in , or is “topology authenticated”  (this information is 
private) 
h. Let , ( )GF q    be a random scalars in GF(q) generated by in  and jn  respectively (this 
information is secret) 
i. Let  2 3:E y x ax b    and P E  be respectively an elliptic curve E and a point in E 
both compliant to security requirements in (Certicom Research Standards, n.d.) (this 
information is public). 
Setting m ck b   in the definition of ( )f : 
 
( )( )
( )
im a c
li i i i
ti ti i i
k a f a a b
K k P s a P
 
 
        
 (10) 
 
( )
( )
( )
j
j
j j
m a c
l j j j
t t j j
k a f a a b
K k P s a P
 
 
        
  (11) 
where setting now 1k   in the definition of ( )f : 
 
( )
( )
i
j
m a
i i
m a
j j
s mf a mb
s mf a mb


    
  (12) 
According to Kerkhoff's principle, the explicit expressions for lk  and tK  are public. 
Given m, c, b and for ,i ja a A  , the following properties hold true: 
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1. Always ECTAK  O. This follows from the condition ( ) 0i jm a a    assumed in (a) 
with P O   
2. Elements in KL are always distinct, i.e. for ,
i jl l
k k KL   is 0
i jl l
k k   which can be 
derived from ( ) 0i jm a a    assumed in (a) 
3. Elements in KT are always distinct, i.e. for ,
i jt t
K K KT   is 0ti t jk k   with P O   
which can be derived from 0
jli l
k k   and //ti lik m k  and //t j l jk m k  (compare 
(10), (11) and (12)) 
4. In each node is tlk K  O that is 0l tk k   with P O   which can de derived from 
the vector identity ( ) 0s a a    for s . 
Theorem (ECTAK Generation). In a node pair in  and jn , given m M  and ,i ja a A  as 
defined in (a), b B  as defined in (b), c C  as defined in (c), 
il
k , 
jl
k  as defined in (e), 
it
K  
and 
jt
K as defined in (f), ,   as defined in (h), and if iECTAK  and jECTAK  are defined as: 
 
jii tl
ECTAK k K    (13) 
and 
 
ijj tl
ECTAK k K   (14) 
then ECTAK is a symmetric key defined as follows: 
 i jECTAK ECTAK ECTAK     ( )i jm a a i jb k m a a P       (15) 
Proof. The proof is straightforward: putting (10) into (13), exploiting the vector algebra 
property    ' ' ' 'a s a s a a      and the property (9) then 
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
ji
i j i j
i i
i tl
l t l t
m a m a
i j j j j i
ECTAK k K
k k P k k P
a kb s a P b ks a a P   
 
   
     
   (16) 
Putting (11) into (14), exploiting the property ( ) ( )j i i i i ja s a s a a      and the property (9) 
then 
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
ij
j i j i
j j
j tl
l t l t
m a m a
j i i i i j
ECTAK k K
k k P k k P
a kb s a P b ks a a P   
 
   
     
  (17) 
Putting (12) into (16) and (17), the expression (15) is obtained in both cases and the proof is 
completed.  Q.E.D. 
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Theorem (Node Topology Authentication). In a node pair in  and jn , if i t jLTV K  O 
then node jn  is an admissible neighbor of node in  or, node jn  is authenticated by in . 
Proof. By definition (g) if node jn  is an admissible neighbor of node in  (or “topology 
authenticated“ by in ) then iLTV  must be co-planar to m  and ja , hence ( ) 0i jLTV m a    
and therefore 0i t jLTV k  ; by multiplying both terms by P O , it turns out 
i t jLTV K O  . It is straightforward to show that function ( , )G u U u U   is compliant to 
requirements R4 and R5. QED. 
Node authentication by topology information introduces an important security 
improvement in the family of TinyECC cryptographic schemes because only the integrity 
check (by means of the Key Derivation Function) of the received crypto-text is actually 
implemented there. 
3.4 Security and cost analysis 
We will show how ECTAKS can enhance the security level provided by TAKS: the relevant 
questions and related answers are as follows: 
1. Which is the entropy per binit associated to ECTAK? ECTAK entropy per binit is 1  
which is the same result for TAKS (Pugliese & Santucci, 2008) as uncertainty about 
t tK k P   is the same as it is about tk  being P a known point. 
2. How much complex is the inverse problem to break ECTAKS (security level in a single 
node)? For the EDLP over E to be intractable, it is important to select an appropriate E 
(it must be a non-supersingular curve) and Eq  such that #E is divisible by a large prime 
or such that Eq  is itself a large prime. Most significantly, no index-calculus-type 
algorithms are known for EDLP as for the DLP (Menezes et al., 1996). For this reason, 
the EDLP is believed to be much harder than DLP in that no subexponential-time 
general-purpose algorithm is known. 
The cost is measured in terms of computational time. We assume to employ 128 bit 
ECTAK keys (i.e. 1282q  ): it can be shown that (15) can be computed through 60000 16-
bit operations (additions and products). If MicaZ motes are employed (8-bit processor 
MPR2400 @ 7.4 MHz), and assuming 10 clock cycles / operation, the cost in terms  
of computation time for the calculation of a 128-bit ECTAK is estimated to be about  
80 ms. 
4. Weak process-based intrusion detection system (WIDS) 
4.1 Motivations 
The further security service component in our Secure Platform is the intrusion detection 
logic (IDS). Its main function is to identify abnormal network activity that differs from the 
expected behavior (Kaplantzis, 2004; Karlof &  Wagner, 2003; Roosta et al., 2006; Sharma et 
al., 2010). We will show how a light state-based anomaly-based detection logic can be suited 
to be implemented over WSN (Ioannis et al., 2007; Jangra et al., 2011; Kalita & Kar, 2009). 
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Smart nodes are typically provided with mechanisms to identify changes in system 
parameters or anomalous exchange of information: such data can be used as relevant 
observations to predict the hidden state of the system and infer whether it is under attack. 
An Hidden Markov Model (HMM), see e.g. (Ephraim & Merhav, 2002), is a doubly 
stochastic finite state machine with an underlying stochastic process that represents the real 
state of the system: the real state of the system is hidden but indirectly observable through 
another stochastic process that produces a sequence of observable events. The relationships 
between hidden states and observable data are stochastic as well as the transitions between 
states. HMMs (Doumit & Agrawal, 2003; Rabiner & Juang, 1986) have been widely used in 
network-based IDS for wired systems (Al-Subaie & Zulkernine, 2006; Khanna & Liu, 2006; 
Luk et al., 2007; Sheng & Cybenko, 2005; Yin et al., 2003) as well as for modeling Internet 
traffic (Dainotti et al., 2008). The Baum-Welch algorithm as likelihood criterion and 
technique for parameter estimation in HMM is extensively used in (Doumit & Agrawal, 
2003) but some training data should be available and still result expensive in terms of 
computational and memory costs. Some conventional intrusion detection systems perform 
cross-correlation and aggregation of data, e.g. by analyzing fluctuation in sensor readings 
(Loo, 2005) or by detecting abnormal traffic patterns (Law, 2005). In general, the application 
of traditional IDSs to sensor networks is challenging as they require intense computation 
capability or too limited to a restricted number of threats. The implementation of an 
effective IDS over a WSN leads to the problem of finding a trade-off between the capability 
of identifying threats (i.e. with a bounded false alarm rate), the complexity of the algorithms 
and memory usage (Baker & Prasanna, 2005; Bhatnagar et al., 2010; Jiang, 2005; Kumari et 
al., 2010). 
Our contribution proposes a novel network-layer anomaly detection logic over WSN 
exploits the Weak Process Models (WPM) and is here simply denoted as WIDS (WPM-based 
Intrusion Detection System): WPM are a non-parametric version of HMM, wherein state 
transition probabilities are reduced to rules of reachability in a graph representing the 
abnormal behaviors (Jiang, 2005). The estimation of a threat in the case of weak processes is 
greatly simplified and less demanding for resources. The most probable state sequence 
generated by the Viterbi algorithm (Forney, 1973) for HMM becomes the possible state 
sequence generated by simplified estimation algorithms for WPM. The intensity of the 
attack is evaluated by introducing a threat score, a likelihood criterion based on weighting 
states and transitions (Pugliese et al., 2008).  
4.2 The scheme 
As stated before, if WPM are used to model behavior, the algorithm to estimate the possible 
state sequences (instead of the most probable ones) is much easier than Viterbi estimator 
(Forney, 1973). But this comes at a cost: due to the cut of lower probabilities (approximated 
to zero) the expressiveness in WPM could be reduced with respect to HMM and false 
negatives can increase. However, it has been shown that adding a certain number of further 
states to WPM, expressiveness could be recovered (Pugliese et al., 2008). Indeed a sort of 
“state explosion” can require added memory for storage but the binary matrices describing 
WPM are very low dense (sparse matrix) and some algebraic tricks can be adopted. Given 
the choice of WPM as behavior model, the question becomes: which behavior should be 
modeled? Our solution is based on two basic ideas: first, the adoption of an anomaly-based 
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IDS and, second, a “hierarchical” model for abnormal behaviors. However, even anomaly-
based detection algorithms are of lower complexity than misuse-based ones, the problem to 
model a behaviour still remains (Debar et al., 1999): usually the question is approached by 
defining different regions in the observation space associated to different system behaviors. 
Further we apply a “state classification”, i.e. we associate each defined region to a specific 
sub-set (class) of WPM states (not single states) according to WPM topology. State 
classification can reduce false negatives and false positives in anomaly detection because 
different state traces (therefore different behavior patterns) contain the same information 
leading to a useful redundancy. In (Pugliese et al., 2008, 2009) we introduced two classes: 
LPA (Low Potential Attack) and HPA (High Potential Attack). 
Definition 1. Low Potential Attack, LPA. An attack is defined in a “low potentially 
dangerous” state (or in a LPA state) if the threat is estimated to be in state jx  which is at 
least 2 hops to the final state. 
Definition 2. High Potential Attack, HPA. An attack is defined in a “high potentially 
dangerous” state (or in a HPA state) if the threat is estimated to be in state jx  which is 1 hop 
to the final state. 
WIDS identifies any observable event correlated to a threat by applying a set of anomaly 
rules to the incoming traffic. An example of anomaly can be the event of a node receiving 
multiple “setup” messages in a short time, or two “topologically far” nodes (i.e. nodes 
whose path length is >>1 hop) to receive similar message sequences. We will show how 
attacks can be classified into low and high potential attacks according to specific states in the 
corresponding WPM-based threat model. Alarms are issued as soon as one or more high 
potential attacks are detected. Considered threats are “hello flooding” and the generalized 
version of “sinkhole” and “wormhole”: we will show that any possible attack against WSN 
network layer protocols can be derived from these models. The security performance 
analysis will be carried out by computing the probability of false positives and negatives. 
However, WPMs technique introduces the following drawback: as very low state transition 
probabilities are reduced (approximated) to zero, it results an increase of false negatives as 
some (hazardous) sequences could be classified as not possible when instead in a 
probabilistic model would be achievable. The number of false negatives decreases if we add 
states (Pugliese et al., 2008) but the drawback is a larger memory requirement. As it will be 
shown in the dedicated sections, Boolean matrices that describe the models are sparse and 
can be compacted for faster computation. The intensity of the attack is evaluated by 
introducing a threat score, a likelihood criterion based on weighting states and transitions. 
Intrusions and violations are classified into low potential attacks (LPA) and high potential 
attacks (HPA) depending on their distance from the state corresponding to a successful 
attack. When at least one HPA occurs, an alarm is issued. Moreover we introduce a score 
mechanism to weight state sequences where LPA and HPA contribute differently so that it 
becomes possible to derive how many LPA and / or HPA states have been experimented. 
Definition 3. Threat Score s at Observation Step k [ ks ]. It is a weighting mechanism we 
apply to states and transitions in a given WPM. Weights are represented by a square n n  
matrix (we denote “Score Matrix” S) whose elements are defined as follows (n is the number 
of states in the WPM): ijs  is the score assigned to the transition from jx  to ix  and jjs  is the 
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score assigned to the state jx . In (Pugliese et al., 2008) it has been shown that 
k k k
hpa lpas Hn Ln   where khpan  and klpan  are the number of HPA and LPA states that the 
system is supposed to have reached up to observation step k, and L, H are values to be 
assigned depending on LPA and HPA state topology in WPM graph (Pugliese et al., 2008) 
respectively. Last we introduce the concept of Anomaly Rule, the logic filter applied to 
incoming signaling messages, which gives two possible results: “no anomalies”, resulting in 
the message being processed further, or “anomaly detected” resulting in a “threat 
observable”.  
The main objective of IDS is to detect attacks coming from insider intruders, i.e. only 
combinations of “hello flooding”, “sinkhole” and “wormhole” threats (Debar et al., 1999; 
Roosta et al., 2006; Singh et al. 2010; Whitman & Mattord, 2011). These attacks are based on 
well-formed messages generated by authenticated nodes where control information is chosen 
to generate malicious network topologies. IDS monitoring domain is restricted to observables 
associated to any combination of these threats (we denote the Aggregated Threat Model).  
In summary the process can be stated through the following steps: 1) Analyze the behaviour 
of the threat; 2) Derive the Anomaly Rules; 3) Derive the WPM-based threat model and 4) 
Assign weights to WPM states and transitions. WPM-based models for single threats are 
shown in (Pugliese et al., 2008). Following these steps, we obtain the WPM aggregated 
model in Fig. 3: ovals represent states, grey border indicate the final states (X_9 and X_10), 
numbers into brackets the associated threat observables. LPA states are X_1, X_2, X_5 and 
X_6; HPA states are X_3, X_4, X_7 and X_8. A positive effect of aggregation is to enhance 
model effectiveness: this is due to the possible sharing of “threat observables” among 
different threats (as it is for “sinkhole” and “wormhole”) and scores can be different. The 
observable 9
ko o  is produced (defining a RESET state) when no threat observables are 
produced after K consecutive observation steps, with K a tunable threshold. 
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Fig. 3. The Aggregated Threat Model 
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4.3 Security and cost analysis 
The security analysis will verify the effectiveness of the proposed IDS in terms of 
probabilities of false negatives and false positives. We introduce the false-negative rate 
( negP ) which represents the rate that the detection algorithm is not able to identify an 
existing threat (alarm mis-detections), and the false-positive rate ( posP ) which represents the 
rate that the detection algorithm identifies undue threats (false alarm detections). 
Definition 3. WPM Memory Length, WML. It is the length of the state sequence trace 
considered for alarms detection. 
Test for alarm mis-detections (False Negatives). We will compute the false negatives 
probability negP  by applying “ad-hoc” observables sequences to WPM model in Fig. 3 
originated by “hello flooding”, “sinkhole” and “wormhole” randomly aggregated. If WPM 
representation is structurally well-defined we should experiment always 0ks   (and 
therefore 0negP  ) for increasing observation steps ( k  ), for any combinations of threat 
behaviors. Here we report the case study with 32k   observables, 10WML   and 3K  : 
suppose an “hello flooding” attack has been engaged against the WSN: in this case the 
Anomaly Rules would produce an observable sequence of the type 
 5;5;*;8;7;*; *;6;6;8;8; *;*; *;8; *; *;5;7;*;*;7;*;6;8;*;*;*;5;5;*; *  (18) 
and, in case of an attacking “sinkhole” / “wormhole”, observable sequences like: 
 2;1;*; *; *;1;*;1;2;2;*; *; *;1;2;*; *;1;2; *; *; *;2;2; *; *;1; *;1; *; *; *   (19) 
 2;4; *;*; *;3;*;3;4;2;3;*;*;1;3;*; *;4;4;*; *; *;2;2;*; *;4;*;3;*; *; *  (20) 
The symbol * means “no observable related to this threat”. According to the previous 
considerations, we preliminarily note that: 
 There are no observable sharing between “hello flooding” and “sinkhole” or “wormhole”;  
 Observables for “sinkhole” are also observables for “wormhole” but not vice-versa. 
Simulations results are graphically reported in Fig. 4 where dark grey bars refer to scores 
produced by individual threat models and light grey bars refer to aggregated threat models. 
As expected the same outputs from both models are obtained only for threats not sharing 
any observable (Fig. 4 a) while different outputs are obtained for threats, as “sinkhole” and 
“wormhole”, sharing at least one observable (Fig. 4 b). 
Test for false alarm detections (False Positives). Not well-defined Anomaly Rules can 
produce “undecided” threat observables which lead to potential false positives, hence 
0posP  . False positives are structurally zeroed if no “undecided” threat observables are 
associated to HPA states. Two approaches can be adopted: 
1. Insert further states associated to truly “threat observables into WPM paths where 
states associated to “undecided” threat observables are leaves: this approach can 
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decrease the probability for false positives ( 0posP  ) because the joint probability to 
reach the leaf state can be very low in long paths; however a drawback is that long 
paths could reduce the system reactivity to threats. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 4. Scores from single (dark grey) and aggregated model (light grey) when (a) the 
sequence (18) is applied and (b) the sequences (19), (20) are applied 
2. Introduce a further class of states associated to “undecided” threat observables: this 
approach cannot decrease the probability for false positives, but “ad-hoc” lighter 
countermeasures can be applied to nodes where alarms from “undecided” observables 
are generated (e.g. node quarantine rather than link release). 
The cost is measured in terms of computational time. If n are the states in the Aggregated 
Threat Model, we can derive that the upper bound complexity in the computation of scores 
and alarms is 26WML n   if WML n . If MICA2 motes (CROSSBOW, n.d.) are employed 
(8-bit processor ATMega128L @ 7.4 MHz), and assuming 20 clock cycles per arithmetic / 
logic operation, the average computation time per 32-bit operation is  3 s. If IMOTE motes 
(MEMSIC, n.d.) are employed (32-bit processor PXA271Xscale@{312, 416} MHz), and 
assuming 5 clock cycles per arithmetic / logic operation, the average computation time per 
32-bit operation is  0.03 s (assuming 300 MHz for the clock). Suppose the case 10n   and 
100WML  . For MICA2 the estimated computation time is 200  ms, for IMOTE 2 ms. 
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5. Secure platform design 
The adopted architectural design (Roman et al., 2006) will be cross-layered (Kliazovich et al., 
2009) and platform-based (Sangiovanni-Vincentelli & Martin, 2001). Cross-layer (CL) results 
in the interplay between network layer (topology management and routing protocol) and 
presentation layer (mobile agent based execution environment for distributed monitoring 
applications): applied to security, an important benefit of CL mechanism is the exploitation 
of the interplay between different security measures in different layers to provide an 
enforced security service to applications. Platform-based design (PBD) results in the 
availability of a software platform where the internal structure is composed by 
“interconnected” SW components, which represent abstractions of the wired hardware 
components. Achievements of research goals are sought by taking care of the following 
major topics: selection of the right layers in the architectural design (a middleware layer is 
an essential component), application of the platform-oriented concepts for service mappings 
between layers, enhancement of the middleware layer with security services offered by 
lower layers entities and, on top, the creation of a flexible AEE by means of agents.  
Fig. 5 depicts WIDS functional blocks: the Threat Model (TM) block implements the WPM-
based model for abnormal system behavior and the Anomaly Detection Logic (ADL) block 
implements detection and alarm generation functions. The Intrusion Reaction Logic (IRL) 
schedules the intervention priority toward the compromised nodes according to specific 
criteria (defense strategy); IRLA applies the countermeasures against attacks to 
compromised nodes, including node isolations (quarantine), key revocations, link release or 
inclusions in black lists / grey lists (Roman et al., 2006). 
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Fig. 5. WIDS functional blocks 
6. Mobile agent-based middleware 
A key characteristic of mobile agent-based middleware is that any host in the network is 
allowed a high degree of flexibility to possess any mixture of code, resources, and 
processors. Its processing capabilities can be combined with local resources. Code (in the 
form of mobile agents) is not tied to a single host but it is available throughout the network . 
Moreover, the mobile agent paradigm supports data-centric applications because the 
implementation code can migrate towards data no matter about node addressing (Hadim & 
Nader, 2006). Therefore in a mobile-agent application execution environment (Szumel et al., 
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2005), each agent implements a sub-set of application components which can be proactively 
aggregated through agent mobility (code mobility across the network). Among the agent-
based middleware solutions available from literature, we will refer to AGILLA (Fok et al., 
2006), developed at the Washington University in St. Louis. There are different motivations 
for this choice. Some of these are listed in the following: 
 it is developed using NesC (Gay et al., 2003) which is a component-based programming 
language (used to develop TinyOS): this occurrence simplifies the integration of further 
components in AGILLA code 
 it is lighter than other mobile agent middleware solutions, e.g. Maté (Levis & Culler, 2002) 
 agent mobility is selective, i.e. no code broadcast, e.g. Impala (Liu & Martonosi, 2003) 
 agents hosted on adjacent nodes can share memory (through the “Tuple Space”) 
AGILLA middleware provides two components that facilitate inter-agent coordination: a 
Tuple Space and a Neighbors List, both maintained on each node by the middleware services. 
A Tuple Space is shared by local agents and is remotely accessible and offers a decoupled 
style of communication where one agent can insert a tuple, another can later read or remove 
it using pattern matching via a template. The Neighbors List is on every node and contains 
the location of all one-hop neighbors. Local agents can access it by executing special 
instructions. The agent architecture is described in (Fok et al., 2006). Code migration is 
implemented by moving or cloning an agent from one node to another. Migration can be 
strong or weak dependently if the current execution state is ported on the other node or not. 
When an agent moves, it carries its code and, if strong move, also state and resumes 
executing on the new node. When it clones, it copies its code and, if strong clone, state to 
another node and resumes executing on both the old and new nodes. Multi-hop migration is 
handled by the middleware and is transparent to the user. It is important to remember that 
AGILLA can initially deploy a network without any application installed: agents that 
implement the application can later be injected, actually reprogramming the network. 
From the function decomposition shown in Fig. 5, the mapping between WIDS functions 
and SW components and mobile agents is shown in Fig. 6: ADL and TM blocks are mapped 
into SW components while IRL and IRLA blocks into a mobile agent, which is denoted by 
Intrusion Reaction Agent (IRA). SW components are indicated with smoothed squares. This 
design allows the optimal allocation and code distribution for those functions that should 
not be implemented anywhere. 
6.1 Enhancements to AGILLA middleware 
Current version of AGILLA foresees that only the AGILLA Manager can read and write into 
the Neighbor List and only the AGILLA Manager and Mobile Agents can read and write 
into Tuple Space.  
As stated before, Neighbors List contains the location of all one-hop neighbors but topology 
authentication provided in ECTAKS should update this list with admissible neighbors only: 
therefore it would be preferred if ECTAKS could read and write into the Neighbor List as 
the AGILLA Manager does.  
Moreover, WIDS should read and write into Tuple Space in order to manage IRA agents 
mobility according to the functional mapping  shown in Fig. 6. 
www.intechopen.com
 Secure Platform Over Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
115 
 
Audit
Data
Alarm
Tracking
Countermeasure
Applica t ion
Threa t
Model 
Anomaly
Detect ion
Logic
Defense
Stra tegy
 
Fig. 6. Mobile Agent-based WIDS architecture 
These enhancements have been designed as NesC stubs (Gay et al., 2003) embedded into 
AGILLA code (Pugliese et al., 2009). Fig. 7 schematically represents this added interfaces as 
bold arrows. 
The first issue that has been actually addressed is related to the interface with the 
Communication Unit. In particular, the first enhancement made to AGILLA has been to add 
some basic mechanisms to let the agents able to retrieve some information about the radio 
traffic from the nodes. More in detail: 
 the node-resident part of the middleware has been modified in order to allow the 
evaluation of some indicators, customizable by the designer, based on the analysis of 
the radio traffic 
 the interface of the middleware towards the agents has been modified to allow an agent 
to retrieve the value of such indicators by pushing them on its stack. 
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Fig. 7. Enhanced AGILLA Mobile Agent-based Secure Platform Architecture 
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In this way, the agents are able to check for anomalous values (i.e. alarms), as described in 
the previous sections. Moreover, this possibility has been added while keeping the existing 
interaction mechanisms between agents and nodes: the agent sees the added indicators as 
virtual sensors (Fig. 8) accessible as if they were normal sensors (i.e. light, temperature, etc…) 
by means of the sense instruction. 
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Fig. 8. Virtual Sensor Architecture 
As a very simple example, if each node evaluates the number of received packets, an agent 
could retrieve such an information as shown in Fig. 8. It is worth noting that the approach is 
exactly the same as the one used to read the temperature sensor. In the sample code the 
agent turns on the red led when the number of received packets is larger than 10. 
In order to make such a first extension to the AGILLA framework, a deep study (that will be 
very useful for future work) of the original architecture has been performed. First of all, it 
has been needed to understand the mapping mechanisms between AGILLA instructions 
and nesC components: each instruction is implemented by a component, stored in the 
opcodes directory, that offers the BytecodeI interface that includes the execute command. Such 
a command is called to execute an instruction that is identified by the codes stored in 
AgillaOpcodes.h used as parameters for the interface. 
6.2 Validation 
In order to validate the first AGILLA extensions and to give the flavor of its exploitation in 
building up the IDS proposed in the previous sections, the following example has been 
selected and concerns a sample agent-based application. More in details, as discussed 
before, by means of the middleware the agents can access to some information about the 
radio traffic (i.e. in this case just the number of the packets received by a node) as if they 
were sensor readings and can react if required. 
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The demo application (Fig. 9) is then based on a sample WSN composed of 4 MicaZ nodes 
and a MIB510 board (connected to a PC) where 3 Agilla agents are injected for monitoring 
purposes. Such agents exploit the proposed middleware extensions and the Agilla reaction 
mechanism while moving on the WSN. The final goal is to detect the nodes that present one 
or more radio traffic indicators out of standard value (i.e. in this case the agents checks for a 
number of received packets larger than a defined threshold). The agents developed for such 
a purpose, called TupleOut, Dynamic and Alarm, are described in the following. 
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Fig. 9. Demo Application Architecture 
TupleOut is a static agent, virtually present on each node to be monitored, that access to the 
radio traffic indicators evaluated by the node-side middleware, checks for anomalous values 
and insert a proper tuple on the tuple space of the node to signal an eventual alarm. In the 
proposed example the agents injected on node #1 checks for a number of received packets 
larger than 5 and, when the condition met, it inserts the alarm tuple on the Tuple Space of 
node #1 (Fig. 10). Dynamic is a dynamic (strong move in the whole WSN nodes) agent that 
looks for alarm tuples in the nodes tuple spaces. It exploits a template-based match by type 
reaction (Fig. 11) to detect an alarm tuple and then to eventually send to the Alarm agent the 
alarmed node ID. Finally, the Alarm agent is a static one that resides in the base station of the 
WSN (node #0). It receives alarm signals and alarmed node IDs and manages them. In the 
example, it simply displays by means of the leds the alarmed node ID and sends also such 
an information to the connected PC. 
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       // INIT 
       pushc 0 
        setvar 0 
        // MANAGEMENT 
BEGIN   pushc 25 
        putled        // Red led on 
        getvar 0 
        copy 
        inc 
        setvar 0 
        // CHECK 
        pushc num_packets  // ID of the virtual sensor 
        sense              // Read the virtual sensor 
        pushcl 5           // Threshold 
        cgt 
        rjumpc OUT         // If > Threshold go to OUT 
        pushc BEGIN        // Else go to BEGIN 
        jumps 
        // ALARM 
OUT     pushc num_packets   // ID of the virtual 
sensor 
        sense 
        pushc 2             // Number of tuple fields 
        out                 // Insert the alarm tuple 
        rjumpc REDTOGGLE 
        // EXIT (ERROR) 
        halt 
        // EXIT (OK) 
REDTGL  pushc 8 
        sleep 
        pushc 25 
        putled 
        halt 
 
Fig. 10. TupleOut Agent 
 
Fig. 11. Agilla reaction 
This simple demo application has been very useful to validate the first extension made to 
the AGILLA middleware and to give the flavor on how AGILLA agents can be used to 
implement the presented security framework. 
7. Compliance to trusted computing paradigm 
As a further aspect in performance assessment and evolution perspectives, it is worth noting 
that the proposed platform can be compliant to the emerging trusted computing guidelines 
(TCG, n.d.). Nevertheless, some attention should be paid in the mapping process of roles 
and functions defined in (TCG Best Practice Committee, 2011) to the underlying technology 
and application scenario of our Secure Platform: as stated in the Introduction, the main 
service supported and enabled by the Secure Platform consists in monitoring structural and 
functional health of industrial plants, which indeed can be configured as an “industrial” 
service. An item-by-item preliminar analysis of compliance to TCG paradigm has lead to the 
following results. 
pusht VALUE  // Type 
pushrt num_packets  // Sensor ID 
pushc 2   // Number of fields 
pushc DO 
regrxn 
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 Security: security modules embedded into the proposed platform can achieve 
controlled access to some critical secured data (e.g. monitoring measurements). They 
also provide reliable measurements and reports of the system‘s security properties 
through the ciphered mobile code transfer mechanism among sensor nodes. The 
reporting mechanism can be fully kept under the owner's control through proprietary 
format messages feedbacks. 
 Privacy: data mainly refer to physical quantities related to the industrial plant under 
monitoring in the considered application scenario. Detection data and observable 
results are transmitted and stored in ciphered mode among Tuple Spaces and the 
random nature of some one-shot cryptographic parameters (see Sec. 3.3 h) enhance 
service confidentiality and reliability, so that the system can be reasonably made 
compliant to all relevant guidelines, laws, and regulations applicable to this case. 
 Interoperability: the adoption of both a platform-based design and a cross-layered 
architecture configures primitives, interfaces and protocols as building blocks of the 
platform model; therefore, the conformance to TCG specifications [TCG WG, 2007] can 
be achieved when compatible with resource limitations of the underlying WSN. 
 Portability of data: it does not completely apply in the considered application scenario, 
as the definition of alarms and observables is based on limited temporal sequences 
which are gradually overwritten in each Tuple Space. 
 Controllability: the analysis of this item requests some clarifications about the role of 
“owner” and “user”: in the considered application scenario, for security and safety 
reasons, the owner of the platform necessarily coincides with the owner of the system 
under monitoring and the “user” can ultimately be represented by a specialized 
operator. User-related information is not present in the system and it never affects 
service operations, the relationship owner - user thus being strictly hierarchical: 
therefore, some sub-items cannot apply (e.g. the user be able to reliably disable the TCG 
functionality in a way that does not violate the owner‘s policy). 
 Ease-of-use: usually specialized SW applications (installed at user premises) devoted to 
post-processing and decision support are comprehensible and usable by specialized 
trained personnel. 
8. Conclusions and perspectives 
In this chapter we have proposed novel contributions about definition of cryptography and 
anomaly detection rules in wireless sensor networks and their implementation in a cross-
layered framework design that we denote “Secure Platform”. Security functions are 
executed autonomously by nodes in the network without any support from outside (like 
servers or database). The proposed schemes have been validated using MATLAB 
simulations and a prototype implementation through mobile agents supported by a MicaZ 
wireless sensor network. This work is a partial achievement of the internal project 
WINSOME (WIreless sensor Network-based Secure system fOr structural integrity 
Monitoring and AlErting) at DEWS, whose target is to develop a cross-layer secure 
framework for advanced monitoring and alerting applications. 
Current work is concerned with several developments. One objective is to extend WIDS to 
detect anomalies in data message content and signaling as well: in this frame bayesian 
analysis and decision techniques (e.g. the Dempster-Shafer theory) have been successfully 
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applied in traditional networks where resource availability is not a problem, but in WSNs it 
might be a big issue. Current research, jointly done with our research partners, deals with 
this topic and we are extending the Weak Process Models approach to this case and to 
derive new “threat observables” in WIDS. Another important issue is to consider 
monitoring as a component in a control process where correlated actuations on the 
environment can be performed. This vision implies the integration of Hybrid System 
Control (Di Benedetto et al., 2009) items into the service platform. Another issue consists in 
the definition of the defense strategy in IDS: rather than listing the possible 
countermeasures, the question is about how to schedule the priorities in case of multiple 
interventions on the network. A multi-constraints (hazardousness and distribution of the 
estimated threat vs. available resources) optimization problem can be a solution.  
Finally, from a signal processing and communication viewpoint, some efforts have been 
already devoted to optimize the information flow on WSNs: the existing correlation among 
measurement information taken from “contiguous” sensing units should be exploited to 
increase coding efficiency without losses (the Slepian-Wolf coding theory). 
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